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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
U-BEVA MINES,
a Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TOLEDO MINING CO.,
formerly AME RI CAN
MINING CO., a Corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

Civil No.
11960

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff-Appellant brought this action to
declare a Lease and Option to Purchase Agreement
entered into by and between the Plaintiff-Appellant
and the Defendant-Respondent terminated and declared null and void as a result of certain alleged
breaches of the Lease and Option to Purchase Agreement and to recover damages from the Defendant-Respondent for the dumping on the leased premises of
certain waste materials extracted from the mining opera-
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tions conducted by the Defendant-Respondent on its
adjacent properties.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court with legal issues
being disposed of in written memoranda submitted by
counsel for the parties to the court. The District Court
granted judgment for the Respondent and against the
Appellant, no cause of action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff-Appellant has taken this appeal and
has requested the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
to reverse the judgment of the lower court and to
adjudicate that said lease agreement is terminated, null
and void and to assess damages in favor of the Appellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
With the exception of certain factual statements
contained on pages 4 and 5 of Appellant's Brief, respondent admits the facts as stated by appellant. This
Honorable Court's attention is drawn, however, to
certain statements made by appellant on pages 4 and
5 of its brief. Appellant claims that Mr. Ken McGriffin testified that at the time of the execution of
2

the lease appellant did not own any other assets other
than those covered by the lease. A close reading of the
record at pages 99 through 101 reveals that Mr. McGriffin in fact had no personal knowledge of what
assets the appellant had at that time and that the best
he could say was that his search of the records revealed
no other assets. Also, on page 5 of its brief, appellant
claims Mr. McGriffin testified that if ore bodies were
found below the waste dumps that said dumps would
have to be removed before such ore bodies could be
mined. What Mr. McGriffin actually testified was that
the dumps would have to be removed before an openpit mining operation could be conducted. He acknowledged, however, that such removal would not be likely
if the ore could be mined underground [R. 94). Appellant also claims on page 5 of its brief that Mr. McGriffin
testified that appellant's land is "subject to open-pit
mining". Mr. McGriffin actually testified that he did
not know if appellant's property was subject to openpit or any kind of mining [R.94] and in fact, he knew
of no ore bodies then existing under the dumps on
appellant's property [R. 99).
Even though respondent admits that the remainder
of the facts stated by appellant in its brief are true,
respondent does not believe that the facts as stated by
appellant are sufficient to provide this Honorable Court
with the proper perspective. Therefore, respondent
recites other additional facts which respondent believes
to be pertinent:
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On July 1, 1963, the appellant and respondent
entered into a mining lease and option to purchase agreement [Exhibit 1-P(b) l. Pursuant to that agreement,
respondent timely paid to appellant the sum of $100
per month for each and every month thereafter as a
minimum royalty payment under the lease [R.90}.
The appellant accepted and cashed all checks before
February 1968 [R.90]. After that date, appellant received and retained the payments made by respondent
but did not cash said checks [R.91).
Paragraph 9 of the lease agreement permitted
respondent to subtract taxes paid by it from the minimum monthly royalty payment. Respondent never
made any such subtraction, however, and paid the full
$100 royalty payment each month lR.90-91 and Exhibit 2-P, the deposition of Wells J. Robertson hereinafter cited simply as Exhibit 2-P, at pp. 14-15 and
Exhibit 3-P, the deposition of Ken .McGriffin hereinafter cited simply as Exhibit 3-P, at pp. 38 and 4ll.
On December 13, 1967, respondent received notice from
appellant that the taxes for 1967 had not been paid
[Exhibit 1-P ( d)]. This was the first notice given by
appellant to respondent with reference to respondent's
failure to make proper tax payments [Exhibit 2-P at
p. 171. In a letter dated February 21, 1968, appellant
notified respondent that 'Vells J. Robertson had paid
the taxes and that the lease agreement had been rejected
by the shareholders of appellant [Exhibit 1-P (f) l.
On February 29, 1968, appellant wrote an alleged letter
of termination to respondent [Exhibit 1-P (g)}. On
4

the same date James P. Cowley, as counsel for respondent, wrote appellant and tendered the unpaid
taxes together with penalty and interest, totaling $95.00
[Exhibit 1-P (h)}. On March 7, 1968, James P. Cowley,
as counsel for respondent, wrote appellant denying and
rejecting the notice of termination [Exhibit 1-P (i)].
In connection with the exploration, development
and mining of its adjacent properties, respondent used
a small portion of the leased premises as a dumping
area for waste material extracted from respondent's
open-pit mining operations. In fact, the dumps only
occupy some l l 1h acres out of a total 250 acres contained in the lease lR.86 and 107l. These dumps were
created during the first 4 or 5 years of existence of
the lease [R.102]. Beginning in the year 1964, Mr.
Ken .McGriffin, who at the time of the trial of this
matter was a director and the president of appellant,
worked as a consultant for the respondent for approximately one year [Exhibit 3-P at p. 10]. In effect, Mr.
Griffin acted as the foreman in charge of respondent's mining operations on the property adjacent to appellant's property covered by the lease
in question [Exhibit 3-P at p. llJ. At this time,
Mr. McGriffin was generally aware of the location
of the appellant's mining claims [Exhibit 3-P at p. 121
and much of the overburden and waste material of
which appellant now complains was placed on appellant's property while l\Ir. McGriffin was superintendent
of the operations of respondent [Exhibit 3-P at p. 141
Mr. McGriffin also testified that he was well aware
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where the dwnps were being placed [R.97-98). Mr .
.McGriffin' s testimony also shows that the dumps in
question were not placed over any presently existing
workings of any mine and that appellant does not know
of any mineral depo_sits underlying the dumps nor
does it have any reason to believe any such deposits
exist [R.99 and Exhibit 3-P at pp. 15-17). The
dwnps were created so that they presented no structural problems to underground mining if an ore body
was found [Exhibit 3-P at p. 35l. 1\ilr . .M.cGriffin also
testified that the dwnps were placed and constructed
in such a manner so as to use as small an area as possible [R.108-109l. "Tells J. Robertson, an officer and
director of appellant, knew of the existence and location of the dwnps at least two years before the initiation
of this law suit [Exhibit 2-P at pp. 18-191 Prior to
the initiation of this law suit, appallant at no time
objected to the use of the leased premises in the creation
of the dumps [R.101) but in fact accepted full royalty
payments during the entire period [R.90-911
The first notice respondent received from appellant
that the lease agreement had not been ratified by the
shareholders of appellant was by letter dated February
21, 1968 [Exhibit 1-P (f) and R.1021 A shareholders
meeting was not called when the lease was first executed
because of the expense involved, but the execution of
the lease was discussed with the major shareholders,
none of whom dissented [Exhibit 2-P at pp. 8-11 and
17-181 After execution of the lease, and prior to any
notice that the shareholders had not properly ratified
6

said lease, respondent spent some $55,000 in exploration
and development of the leased premises [R.87].
Sometime in the latter part of 1966 or the early
part of 1967, appellant requested that respondent supply
it with certain information and data concerning the
property of appellant which is the subject of said
mining lease and option. Respondent complied with
that request by submitting to appellant, by registered
mail, a full report of respondent's exploration and development activities on the property leased from appellant [Exhibit 1-P (c)].
This action was commenced and respondent was
served with Summons and Complaint on June 18, 1968
[R.lJ. Appellant's first cause of action claimed the
lease agreement was void because its shareholders had
not ratified and approved the agreement. The first
cause of action also alleged damages to appellant's
property in the amount of $350,000 [R.1-2). Appe}
lant's second cause of action claimed that if the agreement is valid, then it had been breached in the following
particulars:
(a) Damage to appellant's property in the amount
of $350,000;

( b) Respondent failed to pay taxes on the property;
( c) Respondent failed to operate the property in
a good and minerlike fashion, and destroyed workability of the property;
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(d) Essentially repeats (c) above.
( e) Respondent failed and refused to supply appellant with information required by the agreement and failed to post notices required by the
agreement.
lR.2-3).

With reference to the claimed default for failure
to post notices and supplying certain information, the
record conclusively shows that no notice of such default was ever given to respondent prior to the initiation
of this law suit [Exhibit 2-P at p. 17) except for the
one request for information in the latter part of 1966
or the early part of 1967 which was promptly complied
with by respondent [Exhibit 1-P (c)]. Respondent acknowledged the bringing of this suit as a notice of
default of failure to provide certain information and
to post the required notices, and promptly complied
with those requirements under the lease by posting the
appropriate notices and sending the appellant the required information by registered mail [R.88-90}. Subsequent to the presentation of this evidence at the triaJ
by respondent, appellant offered no additional evidence
pertaining to these claimed breaches, and did not discuss
them further in the memoranda submitted to the trial
court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE 'VAS NO ACTIONABLE BREACH
8

OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT BY RESPONDENT FOR FAILURE TO POST NOTICES AND SUPPLY CERTAIN INFORMATION.
Other than one earlier request that was promptly
complied with [Exhibit 1-P (c) ) , appellant had never
given respondent any notice of default under the lease
for failure to post the required notices or supply certain
information prior to the initiation of this law suit [Exhibit 2-P at p. 171 Upon the initiation of this suit, respondent promptly compiled with the requests of appellant by posting the appropriate notices and by submitting to appellant, by registered mail, the required
information [R. 88-90). Appellant apparently acknowledges this compliance by respondent since these claimed
breaches were not further raised by appellant at trial,
and its brief filed with this Honorable Court makes no
mention of these matters. Therefore, these claimed
breaches have been waived by the appellant and the
decision of the lower court of no cause of action should
not for their reason now be distmbed on appeal.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
HOLDING THAT THE LEASE SHOULD NOT
BE DECLARED TERMINATED BECAUSE
OF DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO MAKE A
9

TIMELY AND DIRECT PAY.M:ENT O.F REAL
PROPERTY TAXES.
Paragraph 9 of the Lease Agreement and Option
to Purchase entitled the respondent to substract the
taxes paid each year by it from the minimum monthly
rental submitted to the appellant .
. . . and Lessee shall pay same and be entitled
to deduct any such taxes discharged by Lessee
and so payable by Lessor, from the minimum
monthly payments or net smelter returns payable hereunder
Respondent continued to pay the full $100.00 monthly
payment, however, and such subtraction from the
monthly rental was never made lR. 90-91, and see also
Exhibit 2-P at pp. 14-15, and Exhibit 3-P at pp. 38 and
411. In effect, the payment of the taxes for the years
1964, 1965, and 1966 without deduction from the monthly minimum royalty payments created a credit account for future tax payments. Such credit account
would have been more than sufficient to pay the $95.00
in taxes, interest and penalty charged against the respondent.
The appellant claims in its brief that there is no
evidence in the record to demonstrate payment of past
taxes which could have created the credit. Yet the record
is clear that all monthly rental payments had been made
in full and that no prior notice of default had ever been
given to the respondent [Exhibit 2-P at p. 17]. The implication is clear that this was the first time that respondent had failed to make timely payment.
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The lower court held that the lease be construed to
require that the $87.10 in taxes [Exhibit 1-P (h)} paid
by Mr. Robertson of U-Beva, as indicated by the letter
of February 21, 1968 [Exhibit 1-P (f) ], be charged
against the respondent's reserve account [R. 65]. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in this holding, claiming that the Lease does not permit such a
credit beyond the calendar year in which the payment
was made. As authority for that proposition, appellant
cites paragraph 2 of the Lease Agreement. Even a casual reading of that paragraph, however, demonstrates
that it applies only to the situation where the payment
of actual royalties during a given month exceeds the
minimum royalty, a topic totally unrelated to the question of tax credits under paragraph 9 of the Lease. In
fact, the citation of paragraph 2 only adds weight to the
respondent's argument that no such limitation was intended. The inclusion of such a limitation in paragraph
2 demonstrates that the parties hereto understood and
considered such limitations. The fact that they expressly
included the limitation in one credit situation and then
fell totally silent on the subject in another credit provision can only indicate an intent that such a limitation
was not to be applicable.
The law of contract construction is a further help in
resolving this problem. In 17 Am. J ur. 2d, Contracts §
500 ( 1964), the rule is stated as follows:
Forfeitures of contracts and rights thereunder
are not favored by the law; rather such forfeitures are regarded with disfavor, and are ab-
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horred, by
. . . Since forfeitures are
not
either m equity or in law, provisions
for forfeitures are to receive, where the intent is
doubtful, a strict construction against those for
whose benefit they are intended. Courts are reluctant to declare and enforce a forfeiture if by
reasonable construction it can be avoided.
It is submitted that interpretation of the Lease Agreement contended for by respondent is reasonable, does
no damage to the intent or purpose of the Lease, and
avoids a forfeiture. The lower court clearly so held and
that finding should not be disturbed on appeal.

Appellant also makes a somewhat curious argument with respect to the appropriateness of a forfeiture
of respondent's leasehold interest under the circumstances of the case. It is first contended in appellant's
brief that this really is not a question of foifeiture at
all, but a problem of termination. On the other hand,
if this is a forfeiture problem, then appellant asks this
court to apply a line of cases which deal with the forfeiture clauses found in real estate contracts. Such
clauses provide that the vendor may keep the payments
made by the vendee as liquidated damages upon breach
of the contract. Each of the authorities cited by appellant, including the law review article, deals with the narrow question of whether the clause in question constituted a penalty and was, therefore, unenforceable. It
should be clear that that question is not even remotely
related to the issue of termination of a lease for failure
to pay taxes. With respect to whether or not the tennination contended for by appellant is a forfeiture, the
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Court's attention is drawn to the definition of that word
found in Black's Law Dictionary 778 (4th ed. 1951)
A deprivation or destruction of a right in consequence of the nonperformance of some obligation or conditions. . . . The loss of land by a
tenant to his lord as the consequence of some
breach of fidelity.
Can there be any doubt that the definition is applicable
to the facts of the instant case? This is even made clearer when revelant case law as it relates to the forfeiture
of a leasehold interest is examined.

It should be noted that notwithstanding respondent's right to a credit against minimum monthly payments for the taxes, within 90 days after the taxes become due and were paid by appellant, respondent reimbursed appellant for those taxes together with penalty
and interest [Exhibit 1-P (b)}. Under these circumstances a forfeiture should not be permitted. One writer
has commended that: "The least favored of all forfeitures are those founded on mere delay in the payment of
money." 17 (A) C.J.S., Contracts Sec. 407 at page 499
(1963). More specifically, the general rule with respect
to relief from the termination of a leasehold interest for
failure to pay taxes is stated in 32 Am J ur., Landlord
& Tenants § 895 ( 1941) as follows:
It seems to be the generally accepted view
that the covenant by a tenant to pay taxes and
assessments is in the nature of a covenant to pay
money, on the same general basis as the covenant
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to pay rent, and forfeiture incurred by its breach
may be relieved against in equity. By the payment of the amount due at any time before the
sale or before the expiration of the right to redeem, the landlord is placed in precisely the same
position as if no default had occurred; and where
there is no bad faith on the part of the tenant
mere delay in making the stipulated payment
should not bar him from relief.
This general rule is clearly borne out by the cases. For
example, in Whitmore v. Meenach, 33 N.E. 2d 408,
410-ll, (Ohio Ct. App. 1940), the plaintiff Landlord
brought an action to forfeit the lease for failure to make
timely payments of taxes and other assessments. During
the leasehold period defendants had put in over $20,000.00 in improvements on the property. The Court
held that there was no forfeiture, and in so stating, the
Court made the following observation:
The law respecting forfeiture is well established. Equity abhors a forfeiture and will only
decree it when such relief is clearly required.
Where the breach is compensable in money a
tender of payment of the amount due will ordinarily be deemed sufficient reason to avoid the
forfeiture . . . . In this case the burden is upon
the plaitniff to establish willful negligence in
some breach of the contract averred or willful
and persistent refusal to observe the covenants or
some of them.
In the decision of Whitehurst v. Ratliff, 198 Okla. 639,
181 P. 2d 545 ( 1947) , an action was brought by the vendor for ejectment of a vendee under a real estate con-
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tract as a result of the vendee's failure to pay taxes on
time and his failure to make interest payments on a
specified date. Upon filing of the Complaint, the vendee
offered to make all payments then due and owing. The
Court held that there was no enforceable forfeiture and
the Supreme Court affirmed. At 181 P.2d 548-49 the
court said:
It is an established principle that equity, by
reason of its general jurisdiction over forfeiture
and penalties, can grant relief from the consequences of forfeitures and penalties. This is done
upon the theory that a clause or provision of the
contract providing for forfeiture upon non-payment is merely considered as security for payment; and equity can grant relief from forfeiture
by allowing adequate compensation.

As noted above in the quote taken from 32 Am. Jur.
Landlord and Tenants § 895 ( 1941), non-payment of
taxes is on the same general basis as non-payment of
rent. The cases on forfeiture for non-payment of rent
should, therefore, be pursuasive. The general rule with
regard to forfeiture for failure to pay rent is also stated
in 32 Am. Jur. Landlord & Tenant at§ 894 (1941).
A court of equity, even in the absence of special
circumstances of fraud, accident or mistake may
relieve against a forfeiture incurred by the breach
of the covenant to pay rent, on the payment or
tender of all arrears of rent and interest by defaulting lessee.
Again, this rule is amply substantiated by the case law.
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For example, in Burrows Motor Co. v. Davis, 76 A.2d
163, 165 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1950), the landlord
claimed the right to forfeit the lease for the tenant's
failure to pay the rent on time. Although late in his payment, the tenant had made a tender of the rent to the
landlord. The Court said, in discussing this problem:
It is well established that as a general rule,
equity will relieve against a forfeiture caused
by non-payment of rent unless it is unjust or
inequitable to do so, the only condition precedent
to such relief being the tender or payment of
the arrears with accrued interest. This rule is
based upon the theory that such forfeitures are
intended merely as a security for the payment
of money and are not intended to enable the
landlord to obtain undue advantage of the tenant. We are clear that the tenant was entitled to
avoid a forfeiture by tender which was made.

In a subsequent decision, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in Molyneaux v. Town House, Inc.,
195 A. 2d 744, 746-47 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963), reiterated
the same rule:
In landlord and tenant cases, it is now well
settled in this jurisdiction that a court of law
or equity may relieve a tenant in possession from
forfeiture of a lease for non-payment of rent by
permitting him before or after judgment to pay
the rent due. This means that all arrears and
rent, interest and costs must be tendered.
See also the Florida Supreme Court decision of
Mayflower Assoc. v. Elliot, 81 So. 2d (Fla. 1955)
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where the court discussed the rule, placing special emphasis on the effect of a tender of full payment. At 81
So. 2d 720, the court said:
'Ve are
of the rule that equity aba forfeiture .... However, in these cases,
should be note? that the primary condition,
if not the sole stipulation required in the condition precedent to relief against the forfeiture
is that the tenant effectively and in good faith
tender payment of the arrears of rent in order
to attain equitable relief against unfair and unjust termination of the tenancy.
Under the circumstances of this case respondent
should be relieved from the consequences of any claimed
default for non-payment of taxes amounting to approximately $95.00. Respondent failed to pay the taxes only
once during the history of the lease and a good faith
tender of the payment of those taxes was made well
within the period of redemption and substantially prior
to the initiation of the action herein [See Exhibits 1-P
(h) and 3-P at p. 37). Respondent's actions do not
show gross negligence nor do they show any willfulness
or intent to avoid its responsibilities. Furthermore, appellant has in no way been injured or prejudiced by the
delay and the trial court expressly so found [R. 112).
On the other hand, respondent has faithfully made all
royalty payments without ever deducting prior taxes
paid [R. 90-91] and has expended substantial amounts
of money in the promotion and development of the leasehold property [R. 87-88). Respondent would, as a
sult, suffer considerable injury if the lease were for-
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feited. A forfeiture of the
for failure to pay taxes
amounting to some $95.00 is, under the circumstances
of this case, improper and the decision of the lower co.urt
so holding should not be disturbed.
POINT Ill
THE LESSEE DID NOT BREACH THE
LEASE BY USING THE PREMISES FOR
THE DUMPING O:F WASTE .MATERIALS.
The Lease clearly and without equivocation permits
the respondent to use the property in the manner for
which the appellant is making complaint. Paragraph I
of the Lease provides that the respondent:
shall also have the right to take possession and
to use and to operate the land and the entire
surface and sub-surface of any and all of the
said mining claims as lessee may deem necessar.IJ
and convenient in connection with its exploration,
development and mining (underground or open
pit) operations on adjoining properties. [Emphasis added.}
Paragraph 3 of the Lease provides as follows:
Lessee shall conduct all operations on the
leaded premises in the manner necessary to good,
minerlike and commercial mining so as to develop and take out leased deposits or with due
regard to the development of the leased deposits,
to the preservation of the workability of workings on the leased premises. Nothing herein, however, shall be construed as in any way limiting
18

the rights of Lessee granted pursuant to paragraph 1 hereof.
'V"hen paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Lease are read
together, their meaning is clear and unambiguous. The
Lessee may use the leased property for any purpose
necessary and convenient to the use of Lessee's other
property and that use is not restricted by paragraph 3
of the Lease, there being a specific exemption. The convenience and economy of placing the dumps at a point
adjacent to and in close proximity with the open pit
mining operations can hardly be doubted. Furthermore,
it is clear that the dumps were constructed and placed so
as to do as little damage as possible to the property of
the appellant. For example, the dumps were not placed
over any presently existing workings of the mine and
appellant does not know of any mineral deposits underlying the dumps nor does it have any reason to believe
that any such mineral deposits in fact exist. [R. 99 and
Exhibit 3-P at pp. 15-171. The dumps were created so
that they posed no structural problems if an ore body
were found and developed [Exhibit 3-P at p. 35] and
the dumps were placed and constructed so as to use as
small an area as possible. [R. 108-09]. In fact, the
dumps only occupy some 11 % acres out of a total 250
acres contained in the lease [Stipulations found at R. 86
and 1071. The evidence is clear that respondent in no
way acted in violation if the rights granted to it by the
Lease.
In contravention of the clear language of the
Lease, appellant presented testimony to the effect that
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it was not usual to use broad language as contained in
the Lease under question when dealing with the right
to dwnp waste on adjacent property. Testimony presented by appellant's witnesses indicated that the usual
mining practice was to specifically include that right in
the mining lease. However, such te!)timony is, in fact,
irrelevant. This Lease does contain language that is
clearly broad enough to grant respondent the right to
dwnp waste on adjoining property. The real issue is
not what is usual, but whether explicit language covering the right to dwnp is legally required as part of the
contract or lease before such right can be enforced. Apparently in support of that position appellant has cited
in its brief some three cases as reported in an annotation
in 83 ALR 2d (1962) beginning at page 665. However,
a close reading of those three cases indicate that their
holdings are in no way determinative of the issues in
this case. Each of those ca!)es involved a right-of-way
deed. The only right negotiated between the owner of
the adjacent surface and the mining operator was the
right to transport minerals from the mine across the adjoining property. The courts held that the mining operator could do anything which was necessary and reasonable in effecting that right. However, dumping
waste materials on the adjacent properties had no relationship whatsoever to the granting of a right-of-way
across the property and was not permitted, therefore,
under the terms of the deeds. On the other hand the
'
court in Pike Floyd Coat Co. v. Nunnery, 2322 Ky. 805,
24 S.W.2d 614 (1929), one of the cases cited by appel20

lant, did make the following comment with reference to
more general mining deeds permitting the use of the
adjoining surface in furtherance of general mining purposes. It should be noted that the type of deed discussed
by the court contained language very similar to that
found in the lease under question. At page 615 of 24
S.W.2d, the court said:
Where the mineral deed confers upon a grantee the use of the surface of the tract of land in
the prosecution of its business for any purpose
of necessity or convcnieru:e, the grantee cannot
be held responsible in damages for exercising its
right, unless it acted arbitrarily, wantonly or
maliciously. [Emphasis added.)
There is no evidence whatsoever to show arbitary, wanton or malicious action on the part of the respondent.
Even if the Lease did not permit the dumping of
waste materials, it should be noted that under the terms
of the Lease the respondent has the right and option to
acquire fee simple title to the property, the rental payments being applicable to the purchase price. If the option to purchase is exercised, the appellant cannot in any
way be damaged. Prior to respondent's failure to exercise that option, appellant cannot show any damage
even if there has been a breach, which the respondent
denies.
On the other hand even if the lower court erred in
'
holding that appellant did not have a cause of action,
appellant should still be barred from any recovery under

21

the circumstances of this case. Appellant has acquiesced
in the activity of respondent to respondent's injury and
prejudice for such a length of time that it is quilty of
laches, has waived any alleged breach, and should, therefore, be estopped from asserting any right which it
might have had. The record is clear that the waste
dumps in question were created over a 4-5 year period
[R. 102} and that appellant at no time objected to the
use of the leased premises in the creation of the dwnps
[R. 101} but in fact accepted full payment of the royalty payments during that period [R. 90-91].
This Court in Ruthrauff v. Silver King Western
Min. and Mill Co., 95 Utah 279, 300, 80 P.2d 338, 347
( 1938), has explained that the enforcement of a claim
"requires conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence. These wanting, the court will remain passive
and leave the parties where they find them." In more
clearly defining what is required in a showing of laches,
this Court said in Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First Nat'l.
Bldg. Co., 89 Utah 456, 515, 57 P.2d 1099, 1125
(1936):
Laches is usually not mere delay, but standing by watching one change his position or delay
for such a length of time that it amounts to an
acquiescence.
As the Court indicated, however, mere delay is not
enough. A showing of some prejudice is also required.
In discussing the question of prejudice, the Court in
Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 107, 245 P. 977, 983
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( 1926) said:

laches exists is dependOrdinarily,
ent upon the particular facts and circwnstances
of the case. While delay is an important factor,
yet mere delay, unless unreasonable or inexcusable is not enough; and of equal importance are
the circll!llstances occll!'ring during the delay,
the relation of the parties to the subject, disadthat may have come through loss of
evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, or injury from other causes.
It is submitted that the facts of this case clearly demonstrate that the dalys of the appellant in asserting its
rights have been unreasonable and inexcuseable and
have resulted in an "intervention of equities." Appellant's own testimony shows that to require the respondent to now remove the waste material dumped on the
leasehold premises would substantially damage the respondent [See Exhibit 5-PJ.
As noted in the Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First
Nat'l Bldg. Co., supra, laches may also be "such a length
of time that it amounts to an acquiescence." An understanding of the doctrine of acquiescence makes it even
clearer that it would be inequitable under the facts of
his case to enforce the claim of appellant. Acquiescence
is basically inaction by the plaintiff which creates a belief in the defendant that the plaintiff will not prosecute
his claim. In other words, when the plaintiff knew, or
should have known, that its rights had been invaded and
then does nothing about it, the defendant is entitled to
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assume that the plaintiff intends to do nothing concerning his claim or right. If the defendant then acts
upon that belief to his detriment, the plaintiff's action
will be barred. The Supreme Court of Washington has
stated the rule as follows:
Upon obtaining knowledge of the facts . . .
[the plaintiff} should commence the proceedings
for relief as soon as reasonably possible. Acquiescence consisting of unnecessary delay after
such knowledge will defeat the equitable relief.

Stewart v. Johnston, 30 Wash. 2d 925, 195 P. 2d 119,
126 (1948).
The Supreme Court of Kansas has styled acquiescence as a delay that "has mislead other parties to their
prejudice . . . ."Calkin v. Hudson, 156 Kan. 308, 133
P.2d 177, 184 (1943). It can hardly be doubted that
the delay of the appellant for some 4 or 5 years while
it stood by and watched the respondent construct the
dump upon the appellant's premises led the respondent
to act to its detriment if the court should now hold that
the lease agreement did not permit the construction of
said dumps. Furthermore, appellant's failure to complain of the alleged breach of the lease while it containued to accept the benefits of the lease in the form of the
monthly royalty payments constituted a waiver of the
breach. See Sprague v. Boyles Brw. Drilling Co., 4
Utah 2d 344, 294 P.2d 689 ( 1956) ; Hein v. Fox, 126
Mont. 514, 254 P.2d 1076 (1953). Appellant should,
therefore, as a result of its !aches, be estopped from as-
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serting any claim for damages for the creation of the
waste dumps.
Even if appellant could properly assert its claim
at the present time, the appellant failed to present sufficient evidence upon which the lower court could have
made a finding of damages. The proper measure of
damages with reference to temporary injury to property
has been clearly stated in 22 Am. J ur. 2d., Damages §
132 at 190-92 ( 1965) , as follows:
The goal of the damage remedy in cases involving injury to a pe:nson's interest in real
property is that of compensation. One whose
interest in realty has been injured by the tortious
act or omission of another is entitled to those
damages which will compensate him for the injury sustained. Generally, this principle is translated into the following two rules of damages:
( 1) the injured party is entitled to recover the
difference between the value of the real property
immediately before and immediately after the
injury (often ref erred to as the "diminution in
value" rule) ; ( 2) the injured party is entitled
to recover the cost of repairing the realty by restoring it to its condition immediately prior to
injury (generally referred to as the "restoration" or "cost of repair" rule) ...
The statement most often found in the opinions attempting to reconcile the two rules is that
the cost of restortaion will be given if it is less
than the diminution in market value.
The proposition stated above finds ample support
in the case law. For example, the Supreme Court of
25

Idaho in Alesko v. Union P.R.R., 62 Idaho
109
P.2d 784 (1941), the court made the following comment with reference to the proper assessment of damages in an action by landowners against a railroad for
damages to land caused from flooding as a result of the
negligent construction and maintenance of a pile-supported trestle.
Even though the injury be only temporary
if the cost of restoration exceeds the value of
the premises in their original condition, or the
diminution in market value, the latter are the
limits of recovery.
The Supreme Court of Washington made a similar observation in the case of Burr v. Clark, 30 \Vash. 2d 149,
190 P .2d 769, 77 4 ( 1948). This involved an action for
damages to plaintiff's residential heating system when
a boiler burst because of the negligence of one of defendant's employees while repairing the heating system. The Court characterized the measure of damages
as follows:
In the case of real property, where the injury
is only temporary, and the property can be restored to its original condition at a reasonable
expense and at a cost less than the diminution
in the value of the property, the general rule for
the measure of damages is the cost of restoration.
There is little doubt that this same rule is followed in
the State of Utah. This Court has so indicated in the
recent case of Lei.shman v. Kamas Valley Lumber Co.,
19 Utah 2d 150, 427 P.2d 747 (1967). This was an
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action for damages to a building sustained as a result of
the breaking under the weight of a winter snowfall of
laminated beams furnished by the defendant lumber
company. One of the issues involved was the proper
measure of damages. Pursuant to that question, the
Court said: "'Vhere the cost of restoration is less than
the diminution of value, the former is the proper measure of damages." The implication of that statement is
clear. 'Vhen the cost of restoration exceeds the diminution in market value, the latter is the proper measure of
damages. As a result, evidence of cost of restoration is
material only if it is shown to be less than the diminution
in market value. This is made clear in§ 23.2 of 5 Nichols
on Eminent Domain ( 1962) . The author discusses _the
proper measure of damages for injury to real property
in terms of the damage rule outlined above and then
describes the circumstances under which evidence of
cost of restoration may be introduced:
Consequently, evidence of the cost of restoring the property as far as possible to its original
relative position, when offered by the owner, is
admissible only when there is also evidence that
such cost is no greater in amount than the decrease in market value of the property if it is
left as it stood.
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that appellant failed to introduce sufficient evidence of the amount
of damages to sustain a judgment in its favor at this
time. Appellant has introduced evidence relating to only
part of the damage question. Through Exhibit 5-P,
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appellant has claimed that the CO$t of restoration of the
premises to their origoinal condition is $437,700.00. On
the other hand, plaintiff introduced no evidence whatsoever with reference to the value of the property before
the dumping of waste materials or with reference to the
diminution of that value as a result of the dumping. The
only evidence to which the appellant may point is the
testimony of Ken McGriffin that in his opinion the
value of the mining claims involved in the leaseholq
property have been depreciated. However, no basis was
ever given for that testimony, nor was any figure ever
set forth as to the amount those claims had been depreciated [R. 93-94L Testimony of the cost of repair to the
premises is only admissible as an element of damage
when it can be shown that the cost of repair is less than
the diminution in market value. Since no evidence of
the dimuntion in market value has been introduced,
evidence on the cost of repair is immaterial and inad-'
missible and the record properly notes our objection to
that testimony [R. 85].
In conclusion it is submitted as follows:
I. The respondent was within its rights under the
lease to use a portion of plaintiff's property for a dump;
2. Even if the respondent was not within its rights,

appellant, because of laches, estoppel, and acquiescence,
has lost its right to complain and is thereby barred;
3. Damages canont be assessed at this time be-
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cause of respondent's right to acquire the property for a
fixed price, in which event there would be no damages;
4. Even if damages could be assessed at this time

the evidence before the lower court was inadequate
cause there was no evidence of diminution of fair market value.
POINT IV
THE LEASE IS NOT VOID BECAUSE IT
WAS NOT RATIFIED BY PLAINTIFF'S
SHAREHOLDERS.
At the outset, it should be noted that as a matter
of law, the appellant has no standing to raise the claimed
failure of the shareholders to ratify the lease agreement.
The law is clear that a provision such as that found in
Section 16-10-74 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. vol.
1962) is for the protection of the shareholders and as a
result, only the shareholders acting in their individual
capacity as shareholders may bring an action claiming
a violation of the above section.
A clear statement of the law is found in an annotation in 58 ALR 2d 784, 793, ( 1958).
A statute of the type under consideration be-

ing for the sole benefit of the
it is
ordinarily held that the corporation itself has
no standing ao allege the inval.idity of the transfer
of its property executed without the consent
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required by the statute of its stockholders ...
A fairly recent use of that rule is found in the case of
Linker Herbert, Inc. v. Marshall, 133 F. Supp. 148
(E.D. Wis. 1955). This was a stockholders derivative
action to set aside a conveyance of corporate property.
Since there can be no derivative action if there is no
right of action in the corporation, one of the issues was
whether the corporation could sue under a statute siinilar to ours. The Court held that there was no action in
the corporation but that the shareholders would have to
bring the action in their own right. In making reference
to the statute, the Court said at page 151:
Furthermore, even if the statute had been
violated, it would have given Del Monte, Inc.,
no cause of action against the defendants. The
statute in question was enacted not for the protection of the corporation, but for the protection
of the stockholders.
A case containing a somewhat similar issue was that of
Schreiber v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 98 F. Supp. 106,
114 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Butte Copper Company had
leased all its property to the Anaconda Copper Company. Stockholders of Butte brought this action against
both companies to set aside the lease claiming that Butte
had failed to get shareholder approval for transfer of
the property under the applicable corporation laws.
of the issues in the case was whether or not the action
was personal to the shareholders or was a derivative action on behalf of the corporation. The Court held that
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the action must have been personal since the corporation
could not have brought the action itself.
Thus it appears that only stockholders of Butte
the right and capaa:°d not
sity to mamtam this action to invalidate the
alleged lease to Anaconda. The right is primary
and personal to the stockholders and is not derived from the corporation.
In reaching this decision the District Court quoted extensively from an earlier circuit court opinion, Westerlund v. Black Bear Mining Co., 203 F. 599, 613 (8th
Cir. 1913) . This was an action by stockholders of Black
Bear to avoid a lease of all the property of the corporation made in violation of the Colorado statutes which
required that the shareholders give approval of transfer of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets.
In discussing who had the right to bring the action under
the Colorado law, the Court said:
[A) corporation which has executed and accepted the benefits of the contract within the
scope of its power, that is neither wrong in itself
or against public policy, and that is defective
only because in its execution the corporation has
failed to comply with some legal requirement
enacted for the sole benefit of third persons, is
estopped to assert it, and
beneficiaries of the
requirement alone may v01d it. Hence the stockholders of the corporation, and they alone have
they alone
the right to avoid the lease .
legal
have any interest in a compliance with
requirement that they should ascent to its execution.
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The first circuit has construed the Delaware Corporation laws in a similar manner. In Greene v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 100 :F.2d 34, 36 (1st Cir.
1938) a corporation had mortgaged all of its property
without the required shareholder approval. The corporation went into bankruptcy and the trustee, as the representative of the corporation and the creditors, brought
an action to set the mortgages aside. With reference to
who could sue under the Delaware law, the court held:
" [T] he provisions of Section 65 of the Delaware Code were not enacted for the protection
of the corporation or its creditors, but were
enacted for the protection of the stockholders
only.
. . .[T}he trustee in bankruptcy, as the representative of the corporation as well as of the
creditors, cannot question the validity of the
mortgages."
Even if this Court should find, however, that ap·
pellant does have standing to raise this issue, the facts
of this case do not support it's claim that the lease should
be void because of appellant's failure to obtain approval
of its shareholders.
It is interesting to note that the Secretary-Treasurer and one of the originators of the appellant testified that they couldn't afford to call a shareholder meeting but that he discussed the Lease with the major shareholders [Exhibit 2-P at pp. 8-lll Nevertheless, it is
admitted that such contact did not technically comply
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with the requirements of Utah law. On the other hand,
failure to comply with Sec. 16-10-74 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. vol. 1962), does not make a contract void
but merely voidable. It is well established that if the
contract is merely voidable, then equitable defens es to
the enforcement of the statute may be raised. In interpreting statutes similar to the Utah statute cited above,
the courts have been unanimous in holding that the
transfer of property in violation of that statute is merely voidable and not void. For example, in Westerlund
v. Black Bear Mining Co., supra at 612-13, the court
was faced with the question of whether or not contracts
made in violation of the Colorado statute were absolutely void or merely voidable. In speaking to that issue the
court said:
It is evident that the encumbering of the
property of the corporation was not malum in
se, that it was not against public policy, and that
the provision of the statute which withheld from
the Board of Directors the power to encumber,
without the approval of the stockholders, was
enacted for their sole benefit, for the single purpose of preventing the corporation and
from depriving them of the use and protection
of the property by the corporation its.elf "'.ithout
their consent. The lease, therefore, is voidable,
not void. It is valid until voided, and not void
until invalidated and is capable of ratification by
estoppel. [Emphasis added.]

The first circuit court of appeals indicated the same
thing in Greene v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., supra,
when it said with reference to the validity of a mort-
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gage of all the corporate property made without the
requisite shareholder approval: "LT] he mortgages were
not void but voidable." The California decision of Solorza v. Park JVater Co., 86 Cal. App. 2d 653, 195 P.
2d 523 ( 1948), gives us a good indication as to why the
courts have so held. This case involved an action by a
shareholder to set aside the sale of all the corporate assets without the proper shareholder approval. The shareholder had argued that the transaction was void ab
initio and as a result no defense was available. In holding the transaction merely voidable at the instance of the
shareholder, the court said at 195 P.2d 527-28:
To hold otherwise would inevitably lead to
wrong and injustice. If persons dealing with
corporations cannot rely at least prima facie upon
deeds, bills of sale and other documents of private corporations apparentliy regularly executed
in the due course of business, pursuant to the
powers conferred by their charters, and attested
by the signatures of the officers upon whom
control of their corporate affairs is conferred by
law, then upon what may they rely?
through
their directors and officers that private corporations deal with the world and manifest their
corporate will. The duly executed instruments,
attested by the officers of the corporation:
the only reliable means one has of
the circumstances under which the act in question
was performed.
Although the Utah Court has never held upon this
particular question, it is suggested that there should be
34

little doubt as to the direction to be taken. Utah's corporation laws are taken from the Model Business Corporation Act; and as a uniform or model act it should
be construed as uniformly as possible in every jurisdiction. Therefore, the lower court was correct in considering the equitable defenses raised by the respondent in
opposition to the enforcement of the statute under the
circumstances of this case.
The first equitable defense raised by respondent
was that of laches. The general rule of laches as
set out by the Utah Supreme Court have been
discussed above. Those principles are as equally applicable to the attempted enforcement of a statutory provision as they are to an attempted enforcement of a contract. In addition, it should be noted
that those principles discussed above are most strictly applied against claims made by the owners of
property of fluctuating or speclative value. This rule
is well stated in 30A C.J.S., Equity § 118 at 67-68
(1965):
A marked appreciation or depreciation according to the circumstances, in .the
of the
property invoked, where the right might have
been asserted before such change, and the granting of relief would in
of the chan.ge
work inequity, is ordmarily fatal to
pla.mtiff's case. A person may not withh?ld his claim,
awaiting the outcome of an
then,
after a decided turn has taken place m his favor,
assert his interest, especially where he has thus
avoided the risks of the enterprise.

35

Accordingly, if the property involved is of
a speculative or fluctuating character, more than
ordinary promptness is required of the claimant;
he must press his claim at the earliest possible
time. This rule is applied with great strictness
in the case of oil or mining property since it
of a specially precarious nature and is exposed
to the utmost in fluctuations in value.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated the same
rule as follows in the decision of Winn v. Shugart, 112
F.2d 617, 622-23 (10th Cir. 1940). The court said:
The duty to act with dispatch is especially
imperative when one claims an interest in property that is highly speculative. One may not
withhold his claims to a highly speculative venture, such as was involved in these wildcat oil
and gas leases and permits, to await the outcome
of an effort to develop an effort put forth by
another, and then when his efforts are crowned
with the current success, come in and claim the
fruits thereof. Such a course does not commend
itself to a court of equity ....
Laches does not concern itself with a mere
lapse of time, but with the equity of permitting
the claim to be enforced.
Furthermore, when dealing with property of the fluctuating market value, the delay in bringing the action
need not exist for any great length of time. In Carrier
v. Dixon, 142 Tenn. 122, 218 S.W. 395, 396 (1919),
the majority stockholder of the corporation authorized
the sale of the assets of the corporation to the defendant.
Within a few months of the transfer the plaintiffs,
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dissenting minority shareholders, brought this action
to have the transfer of the assets of the corporation set
aside. After pointing out that the plaintiffs knew of the
activities complained of long before the action was
brought, the court made the following comment:
\\Tith such knowledge and without objection,
they st?od by for months and witnessed large
expenditures by the defendant in furtherance
of the new concern, knew of the payment of the
debts of the old corporation, and not until success was apparent was redress sought. They
cannot await successful or unsuccessful turn of
affairs before seeking relief.
Keeping in mind this rule of strict enforcement of
!aches against owners of propery involving fluctuating
market value, there can be little question that laches
is applicable in this case. The situation out of which
this action arose was clearly created by the conduct of
the appellant. It was the appellant who entered into
the lease without getting prior approval of its shareholders and as noted in the decision of Solorza v. Park
Water Cu., supra, the respondent had the right to rely
upon the authority of the officers and directors of the
appellant and assume that the lease had been properly
executed. After execution of the lease, respondent proceeded to spend some $55,000.00 in exploration and
development of the leased premises ER.87). N evertheless, appellant delayed a substantial period of time in
bringing this action to rescind the lease and at no time
during that period did it ever give respondent any
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notice of the failure of the shareholders to approve the
lease [R.102). In fact, no one connected with the corporation ever objected or disapproved of the contract
until after the development and exploration work of
respondent had been substantially completed. [See Exhibit 2-P at pp. 10-11 and 17-18).
A number of courts have recognized that !aches
is a proper and valid defense under the circumstances
similar to the case now before the court. For example,
in Walden v. Walden, 105 So. 2d 105, 107 (Ala. 1958),
a minority stockholder brought an action to set aside
the transfer of the assets of the corporatoin to a partnership claiming that the transfer was not made in compliance with an Alabama statute requiring approval
of such transfers by a 4/5 majority of the stockholders
of the corporation. In holding that the minority stockholder was guilty of laches, the court said:
The transfer of the assets of 'V alden-Gambal
Motor Company to Walden-Taylor Company,
Ltd. occurred more than 10 years prior to the
filing of the bill; 'V alden-Gambal Motor Company is an Alabama corporation not yet dissolved; no concealment of anything that was
done by the respondent is avowed, but to the
contrary it appears that the respondents discontinued the operation of the automobile business
under the name of 'V alden-Gambal Motor Company and reported the partnership agreements
for the purpose of operating an automobile business of Walden-Taylor Motor Company, Ltd.
It further appears that they have continued to
operate such business so as to cause appreciable
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increase in the value of the business. We do not
see how it is possible for the complaintant to conthat .in this
he was exercising such
v1g1lance m connection with his rights as a stockholder as to excuse him of the charge of laches.
The importance of open and public activities of
the one asserting laches is even more clearly emphasized
in Medallion Oil Company v. Hinckley, 92 F.2d 155
(9th Cir. 1937). Here the plaintiff had expended considerable swns of money for the development of an
oil well in the Kettleman Hills area of California prior
to the passage of the Oil and Gas Leasing Act. When
these efforts were not crowned with success, the plaintiff abandoned the oil property even though the chief
geologist of plaintiff continued to try to interest the
oil company and others in the continued development
of the oil wells. Failing to do so, the geologist made
application under the newly passed Oil and Gas Leasing Act for an oil and gas lease for the property. Such
lease was granted in the year 1920 and a successful and
profitable well was ultimately brought in. This action
was initiated against the geologist in 1923 complaining
that he had acted for and in behalf of the oil company
in expending his own monies and his own time in the
development of the well. The trial court held for the
defendant and the Circuit Court affirmed. The
taken by the geologist were a matter of public record
and in no way did he attempt to conceal his actions
but in fact contacted members of the oil company in
an attempt to solicit their help and aid. In holding
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Medallion barred by laches the court said at 92 F.2d
160:
In discussing the preemptory nature of the
duty to exercise diligence which rests especially
on those claiming ownership of oil properties,
the Supreme Court in Twin-Lake Oil Company
v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 592, 23 L. Ed. 328,
observed: "The fluctuating character and value
of this class of property is remarkably illustrated
in the history of the production of mineral oil
from wells. Property worth thousands today is
worth nothing tomorrow, and that which would
today sell for a thousand dollars as its fair value,
may, by the natural changes of a week or the
energy and courage of desperate enterprise, in
the same time be made to yield that much every
day. The injustice, therefore, is obvious in permitting one holding the right to assert ownership in such property to voluntarily await the
event, and then decide, when the danger which is
over has been at the expense of another, to come
and share the profits.
The court in King v. Los Angeles County Fair
Ass'n., 70 Cal. App. 2d 92, 161 P.2d 468, 471 (1945),
found minority shareholders guilty of laches. It appeared that some two years after one corporation had
transferred all of its assets to a second corporation, a
group of stockholders brought this action to set the
transfer aside. In finding the action barred by laches,
the court said:
These plaintiffs, however, did not file their
complaint until two years and one month after
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the_ transfer of the
to the successor corpora hon and not until one year and two months
after the dissolution of the predecessor corporation. Also, nearly a year elapsed between the
transfer of the assets and the dissolution. N 0
facts or circumstances are alleged to excuse this
delay and "if circumstances that might cause the
it will be
that
delay are not
they do not exist. . . .
It is interesting to note that the appellant has never
offered any justification for its delay in bringing the
present action.

In 1'iffany v. Smith, 124 N.Y.S. 85, (N.Y. Supp.
Ct. 1910), the corporation had a judgment entered
against it based on notes it owed a bank. Ten days
thereafter, the sheriff levied execution based upon the
judgment and sold the property of the corporation
to an individual, acting for and in behalf of some of
the directors of the corporation, who subsequently conreyed the property to said directors. This action was
brought asking that the transfer of the property be
set aside, on the ground that the directors had purchased the property as trustees of the corporation. There
was a lapse of some 51/2 years between the sheriff's sale
and the bringing of this action. The court held that
the action was barred by }aches. At 124 N.Y.S. 88-89,
the court said:

I TJhe plaintiff waited about 51/2 years before
filing in a court of equity for relief, when he and
the other stockholders knew within a few days
after the execution sale that the defendants had
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acquired the property and were proceeding to
continue the business formerly conducted by the
Shad Wheel Company. During that 51/2 years
invested. a large amount of money
m the unprovement of the business and property, while the plaintiff and his
stood by apparently waiting to see whether the
business would prove to be a success before deciding to bring this action. Courts of equity are
not in the habit of granting relief based solely
upon the technical right to avoid a sale of this
character as one who is in a position of trustee.
Claimant is guilty of gross laches in delaying
to assert his rights where it would be grossly
inequitable to do so by reason of the changes in
condition of the property brought about by lapse
of time and investment of additional capital and
labor by the defendants.
One last case, a decision by the Arizona Supreme Court,
will be cited with reference to the question of laches.
In Alger v. Brighter Days Min. Corp., 63 Ariz. 135,
160 P.2d 346, 351-52 (1945), an action was brought to
have the sale of assets of the corporation set aside as
a fraud on dissenting shareholders. The corporation
was in financial trouble and the Board of Directors
organized a new corporation and transferred the mining
properties of the defendant to the new corporation.
The conveyance was accomplished through a middle
man named Benz. One of the issues raised in this case
was the question of whether or not laches barred the
right of action of the shareholders. The court said:
The facts and circumstances appear to be sufficient to justify the Court's finding that plain-
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tiffs and all stockholdes of Samoa were guilty
of laches. The transactions complained of appeared in May and July, 1938. The deed to the
new corporation was placed of record in October
of that year. More than three years elapsed after
the sale to Benz and almost three years after the
recording of the deed to Brighter Days before
the suit was instituted in September, 1941. During the three-year period stock was sold by the
new corporation and various persons invested in
it. It also spent considerable sums in the development of the property. It appears, and this
was the trial court's findings, that the stockholders had knowledge of the transaction in 1938.
We agree with the trial court that they were
guilty of laches by unreasonable delay in taking
action. It is well said that a minority stockholder
may lose his right to sue or defend on behalf
of the corporation if unreasonably delaying, with
knowledge of the facts, to bring suit. Here also
there was acquiescence for a long period . . .
The court correctly held, under these circumstances, that plaintiffs' right to challenge the
transactoins complained of was lost by laches.
The second equitable defense asserted by the respondent in the court below was equitable estoppel. The
basic elements of that concept have been set out as follows in 28 Am. J ur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 35
(1966):

Broadly speaking, the essential
of
an equitable estoppel or estoppel m pais, as
related to the party to be es topped, are: ( 1)
conduct which amounts to a false representation
or concealment of material facts, or, at least,
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which is calculated to convey the impression
that the facts are otherwise than and inconsistent with, those which the .party. subsequently
the mtenho11, or at least
attempts to assert; (
the expectation, that such conduct shall be acted
upon by, or influence, the other party or other
persons; and ( 3) know ledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. And, broadly speaking,
as related to the party claiming the estoppel, the
essential elements are ( 1) lack of knowledge
and the means of knowledge of the truth as to
the facts in question; ( 2) reliance in good faith,
upon the conduct or statements of the parties
to be estopped ; and ( 3) action or inaction based
thereon of such a character as to change the
position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice.
The decision of Solorza v. Park Water Co., supra,
clearly demonstrates that the execution of a document
by the officers and agents of the corporation is in effect
a representation by that corporation that said officers
have the authority to execute such agreements and that
the other party dealing with the corporation may reasonably rely upon that authority. The respondent had
no way of determining whether a shareholders' meeting had in fact been held since it did not have access
to the corporate books and as a result relied upon the
implied representations of appellant's officers. Based
upon that reliance, respondent expended some $55,000
in development and exploration of the property. Unquestionably, the facts of this case clearly fit within
the requirements of equitable estoppel.
There is an ;idditional principle of estoppel which
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even more clearly applies. The courts have held that a
person may not accept and use the benefits of an agreement and then deny the existence of that agreement or
the obligations thereunder. The general rule is stated
thusly in 28 Am. J ur. 2d, Estoppel & Waiver § 59
(1966):
Estoppel is frequently based on the acceptance and retention, by one having knowledge or
notice of the facts, of benefits from the transaction, contract, instrument, regulation, or statute
which he might have rejected or contested. This
doctrine is obviously a branch of the rule against
assuming inconsistent positions, and it has been
said that such cases are referable, when no fraud,
actual or constructive is involved, to the principles of election or ratification, rather than to
those of equitable estoppel. The result produced,
however, is clearly the same, and the distinction
is not usually made. Such estoppel operates to
prevent the party thus benefited from questioning the validity and effectiveness of the matter
or transaction insofar as it imposes a liability
or restriction upon him, or in other words, it
precludes one who accepts the benefits .from
pudia ting the accompanying or resultmg obligation. And the principle of estoppel by acceptance of benefits may operate to prevent a party
from profiting by his own wrongs.
A clear example of the application of the above principle is found in Spain Management Co. v. Pack's Auto
Sales, 54 N.M. 64, 213 P.2d 433 (1950). An agent and
officer of the defendant corporation borrowed money
in behalf of the corporation on a car that the corporation
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did not have title to. When it was determined that the
corporation had no title to the car, the lendor brought
action to have the transaction set aside. The defendant
corporation defended on the basis that its agent and
officer had exceeded his authority in obligating the
corporation and that as a result, the contract was void.
The court held that the corporation was "estopped"
to deny the authority of the agent.
The defendant received the money of the plaintiff on the security of a car which it did not own.
It does not attempt to show the findings of the
trial court in this respect is not supported by
substantial evidence, and having received the
benefits it is estopped to question the authority
of its agent to execute the note and mortgage and
bind it.
In applying the above-cited principle in a factual situation which is somewhat analogous to the instant case,
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Luker v. Kells,
411 P.2d 511, 516 (Okla. 1966), held that a corporation who had received a $3,600.00 payment for the purchase of a 1/64 interest in an oil and gas lease could
not subsequently deny that it had intended to sell the
lease property. The court said:
Defendant's testimony acknowledged that he
and De Vore received $3,600.00 from plaintiff
as payment of 1/64 interest in the promotion.
A voluntary acceptance of the benefits of the
transaction is equivalent to consent to assume
all obligations arising therefrom so far as the
facts are known, or should be known by the
acceptor.
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Greene v. Reconstruction Ji'inance Corp., supra, applied the same
principle while calling it "ratification by estoppel."
The court said as a partial justification of the decision
in that matter:
(TJhe mortgages were not void but voidable.
In other words, that they were contracts made
by the corporation within the scope of its corporate powers, not contracts that it could not
make any way or manner or under any circumstances, and were capable of ratification by
estoppel. The corporation is estopped to question
the validity. It received the consideration for
the mortgages and has kept the same.
California has used this same principle in a case which
it declared was based on laches. In Neet v. Homes, 25
Cal. App. 2d 477, 154 P .2d 854 ( 1944), the plaintiffs,
who were the owners of 55/100 interest in three
ented mining claims, were induced, through fraud, to
transfer those mining claims to a corporation in return
for stock. The corporation subsequently leased these
patented mining claims. Said claims were the sole assets
of the corporation. The plaintiffs brought this action
to have both the original conveyances to the corporation
and the subsequent lease declared invalid. The court
held the plaintiffs guilty of laches. This action was not
initiated until almost two years after plaintiffs became
aware of the lease. During that period of time the plaintiffs accepted substantial royalty payments from the
defendants. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs maintained that
a prior action initiated about a year earlier and which
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had subsequently been dismissed had stopped the running of time and plaintiffs were not, therefore, guilty
of laches. The court indicated that even if only a period
of a year had passed between the giving of notice and
the initiation of action, it was still long enough to constitute !aches since the plaintiffs had accepted the benefits of the lease. The court said at 154 P.2d 854:
Assuming that the commencement of a prior
action might have a bearing upon the question
of laches, it nevertheless appeared that no such
action was commenced until more than a year
after the notice of recision and until after the
plaintiffs had accepted over $26,000.00 in additional royalties under the lease.
These cases clearly demonstrate that two elements
must be shown before this principle of estoppel may be
enforced. First, the person against whom the estoppel
is to be forced must have had knowledge of his rights.
Second, that person must have directly received and
accepted benefits from his failure to assert his rights.
Those two elements may be clearly demonstrated in
this case. Appellant knew from the outset that the lease
had not been approved by a majority of the shareholders
and that it could, therefore, bring action to rescind the
contract. In spite of that knowledge, it without exception accepted the royalty payments for each month. As
a result, the corporation should now be estopped from
asserting the invalidity of a contract under which it
accepted benefits.
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CONCLUSION
In July of 1963, plaintiff and defendant entered
nto a contract and pursuant thereto defendant has paid
o plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per month. In addition,
Jefendant has spent $5.5,000 in exploring the property
md has developed some indications of a potential ore
)ody. It does not seem reasonable that because of a 90,Jay delay in payment of taxes in the amount of $95.00
that respondent's rights should be terminated or for:eited.
Under the lease respondent had the specific _!'jght
:o use appellant's property as necessary and convenient
:o respondent's other property. The respondent did so
1se 11.5 acres of appellant's 250 acres. Appellant never
ibjected to such use until shortly before this action was
:ommenced. The appellant has not been damaged and
s now estopped to complain.
It would seem unreasonable to permit the appellant
lo have the benefit of its bargain over a six-year period
-collect the rents and taxes, have its property explored,
iee a possible ore body developed, and then say ""\Ve
iidn't mean it· our shareholders never ratified the agree'
:nent, so you can suffer the loss and we will take our
/roperty back."
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the lower court in favor of respondent and against the
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appellant, no cause of action, should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
JAMES P. COWLEY
GLEN E. DAVIES
400 El Paso Gas Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
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